The role of both China and the Soviet Union in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953
Lam Kin Kong
Hong Kong Baptist University
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The role of both
China and the Soviet Union in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953
Introduction
In the
book “The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished”[1],
the writer Stanley Sandler described Korea as a colony that most Americans
could not find on the map. However, the Korean War was one of the bloodiest battles
in their history.
The
Korean War, in fact, was the product of a special international environment and
the Cold War mentality. By the end of the World War II when Japan was near the defeat
by the allies, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to divide Korea into
two sides according to the 38th parallel. In the North, Kim Il-sung created the
North Korean Peoples' Army with the support of the Soviets. In the South, American
gave back the administration to the presidency of Syngman Rhee, who aimed to
unite the nation by force.
To focus
on the roles that China and the Soviet Union might play in the Korean War, I
would like to follow the historical timeline and discuss the topic by answering
these three main questions:
1) Who
planned the war?
2) What were
the roles that China and Soviets play in the Korean War?
3) Did
China play a bigger role on world stage after the truce of Korean War?
Korea under the new international order
In the
post war international order, Korea’s position was directly affected by the new
regional situation. The defeat of Japan transformed the international status of
Korea from a colony to an occupied territory, which was divided to different
administrations by United States and Soviet Union. Actually, the Allies met in
a series of war-time conferences and discussed Korea’s post-war fate. Sadly,
the trusteeship plan was never formally approved.
“…Both the United
States and the USSR were committed to dismantling the Japanese colonial empire
and restoring Korean sovereignty. The Americans wanted two essential
characteristics in regimes within their sphere: anti-communist forces in
control of the state, and freedom for private capital. The Soviet Union, in
contrast, required a communist or socialist party in power, and a nationalized
economic base. These conflicting requirements made any national reunification
of Korea extremely problematic from the start.”[2]
According
to Cho’s book[3], the
primary objective of the proposal (of American) was to prevent Soviet’s
occupation of the entire peninsula, which was considered as a threat to Japan’s
security. He also explains the US non-recognition policy as a reflection of the
basic attitude toward Korea:
“..America was not
necessarily ready to grant Korean independence at the expense of its own
national interests. It was true she wanted the peninsula to be free,
independent, and united, but not if it were to be governed along communist
lines.”[4]
By 1950,
a “red scare” had spread throughout the United States. For many Americans, the
United States was imperiled by the threat of communism both at home and abroad.
With the idea of “Cold-war mentality”, it is easy to understand that U.S tried
to prevent Soviets from expanding his red-power in Asia especially after Soviet
Union’s successful testing of an atomic bomb in September.
“To allow Korea to
fall to the communists so soon after China had fallen, therefore, would turn
the American people even more against an already unpopular president and
administration, especially if it were revealed how sadly unprepared the United
States was for war. It also would damage American prestige in Europe and the
Middle East, and smack of appeasement, which could lead to further aggression,
just as the Munich Agreement of 1938 had nurtured Adolf Hitler’s expansionist ambitions.”
In fact,
U.S was committed to resurrecting post-war Japan as a major power in East Asia
to replaced the character that China should played for the international
consideration. For Korea, it was regarded only a market for Japanese goods and
as a source of rice for Japan, just as the role it had played when Korea is under
the Japanese occupation. Conversely, the loss of Korea to the communists would
pose a real risk to Japan because it was by only 100 miles from the Korean port
of Pusan.
Who planned the war?
With
respect to this question, I believed that the Soviets and the People's Republic
of China (PRC) played a reluctant but, nevertheless, significant role in Kim’s decision
to invade South Korea in 1950. Without their agreement, North Korea would not,
probably, have made the attack.
For Stalin,
promoting the proletarian world revolution and overthrowing the capitalism was
actually one of the USSR’s sacred state missions. Based on the perspective of Marxist
concept, the end goal is to achieve socialism all around the world, and later
the stateless communism. However, according to the study of Fan Zhang, what
Stalin really considered was the national security.
“…Joseph V.
Stalin’s ambivalent foreign policies projected new motives of the superpowers
by which ideology was only a mask for vested national interests... In other words, the state leaders were more
concerned about their nation’s “vested interests,” rather than their ostensible
ideological commitments.”[5]
Professor
Shen Zhihua shared a similar view in his book “Mao, Stalin and the Korean War:
Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s”. He claimed that Stalin believed that
Soviets national interests were equal to the interests of socialism and the
fundamental interests of mankind.
“…his logic went,
the interests of world revolution should be subordinated to Soviet national
interests. Whether and when the people of a country should rise in revolution,
and whether are not the Soviet Union should support a given national liberation
movement, depended on whether or not a revolutionary movement was helpful in
promoting Soviet national interests. This was Stalin’s unwavering logic.”[6]
We can
found the consideration of Stalin about the growing pressure from the opponent
in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. – "The
38th parallel must be peaceful. It is very important", Stalin told Kim
when they had a meeting in the Kremlin on 5 March 1949. When Stalin tried to
prevent a war in Korea, the North Korean leadership put increasing pressure on
the Kremlin, demanding permission to liberate the South.
On 7
March 1949, Kim II Sung said to Stalin in Moscow about his idea. -
"We believe
that the situation makes it necessary and possible to liberate the whole country
through military means.“
However,
after a short discussion, the Soviets leader disagreed with Kim by citing the
militaries weakness of the North, the Soviets-United States agreement on the
38th parallel and the possibility of American’s intervention to the war.
Peter
Lowe points out that Stalin was concerned primarily with two main reasons. The
first reason was that Stalin tried to bolster his authority within the Soviet
Union. Another was that he did not intend to take any action which would cause
internal difficulties and conceivable threat to his dominance.
Vojtech
Mastny suggested that the world revolution was actually a tool for him to
maintain his power in Soviets. -
“Despite Stalin’s
ideological dedication, revolution was for him a means to power rather than a
goal in itself.”[7]
So it is
not difficult to understand that Stalin changed his attitude after the progress
of a new international environment.
Kim II
Sung complained to Soviet ambassador Shtykov on 17 January 1950. -
"I can't sleep
at night because I am thinking of the unification of the whole country. If the
cause...is postponed, then I may lose the confidence of the Korean people.“
It was surprise
to Kim that Stalin blessed the invasion on 30 January. -
“If he wants to
talk to me on this issue, then I'll always be ready to receive him and talk to
him...I am prepared to help him in this matter.”
Since
the ultimate goal of Soviet foreign policy was to ensure his own national
security interest, it can be analyzed then with the needs of Soviet’s Far East
policies. William W. Stueck explained this kind of change with the factor of
Mao Zedong and his new China.
After
the founding of New China in 1949, leader Mao Zedong wanted a new Sino-Soviet
treaty to replace the one which Stalin had signed with the Nationalist leader
Chiang Kai-shek in 1945 which about the occupation of Changchun Railway and
ice-free ports of Lushin and Dalian.
“Should Kim
succeed, the Soviet Union would at least gain access to the ice-free ports of
Inchon and Pusan. Should Kim fail, as a result of intervention by the United
States, China would be threatened sufficiently to request the Soviet Union, at
least temporarily, to maintain its position in Manchuria.”[8]
The U.S.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded Korea and Taiwan in their defense perimeter,
which was another factor for Stalin to bless the invasion. Following the speech,
Kim renewed his overtures to Stalin and discussed his plans of attacking South
Korea. This time, Stalin approved the plan to reunite Korea and promised to
supply North Korea with arms and other military equipment after Kim promised
that he could defeat South Korea within a short periods.
Stalin was
concerned that the war in Korea might lead to another world war but he did not
want to put himself in the same embarrassing position like a year earlier when
he did not give Mao and the Chinese communists the real support they wanted in
the civil war against the Nationalists. Indeed, according to some scholars,
Stalin waited until Mao agreed to support the invasion before he gave his words.
Byong
Moo Hwang concluded that Stalin gave Kim the green light to launch a war under
four conditions[9]:
1) the need for
careful evaluation of Americans’ interference;
2) the Chinese
leadership’s endorsement before the war started;
3) the awareness
that the Koreans should not count on direct Soviet participation in the war
(Stalin again urged Kim Il Sung to consult with Mao Zedong); and
4) the Northerners’
thorough preparation for war.
Throughout
the Korean War, Soviet Union as a leadership was clearly in charge. Stalin made
the decision of the time to start the conflict, directed Kim how to fight and
organize the command structure, and instructed the Korean command on its every
move. To describe the relationship between Stalin and Kim, we can quote the
saying from Peter Lowe’s book:
“Stalin and Kim
once described by an American army colonel as similar to that obtaining between
Walt Disney and Donald Duck.”[10]
Compare
with Soviets, China played a passive role. On May 15, 1950, without being
informed of the recent consultation between Stalin and Kim, Mao met secretly
with Kim Il Sung and finally approved completely Kim’s plan of invasion to the
South which Stalin and Kim had agreed upon earlier in Moscow. Mao also claimed
that if Americans took part in it, then China would help North Korea with
troops.
For Kim Il
Sung, China’s approval on his plan was required mainly by Stalin’s instruction
that the final decision on the invasion plan had to “be made jointly by Chinese
and Korean comrades.”
“Kim was more than a lackey of Moscow and Beijing
as he had been commonly portrayed by historians for much of the period after the
war.”[11]
Meanwhile,
the division of responsibility between Moscow and Beijing is clear: Soviets
would support North Korea with military equipment while the PRC would support
with troops, if Americans intervened in the Korean conflict. But why did Stalin
ask Kim to get Mao’s approval for the invasion plan, and why did Mao accept
such an important obligation?
Mao's "lean-to-one-side"
In the Post-WWII
periods, when the Cold-War escalated with the enlargement of the
Soviet-American confrontation and the Chinese Communist Party were going to win
the civil-war, Mao wanted the support from Soviet Union. On 30 June of 1949, he
issued his famous "lean-to-one-side" statement to the world:
“Externally, unite
in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equal
and unite with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally ourselves with the
Soviet Union, with the People's Democratic countries, and with the proletariat
and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an
international united front.... We must lean-to-one-side.”[12]
In early
1949, when the CCP was near the final victory in the civil war, their leaders
became concerned about the opportunity that American might intervene in China.
As a result, by allying with the Soviet Union, Mao and the CCP leadership hoped
to be in a stronger position to face a hostile America. "Lean-to-one-side"
was actually the only option for the CCP leaders.[13]
Chen
Jian, in his working paper for the Cold War International History Project,
believed that Mao was efforts to adjust the relations with the Soviet Union.
“Considering the
frequently unpleasant history of CCP-Soviet relations, Mao hoped to send a strong
signal to Stalin to show his willingness for friendship and cooperation.”
Another
reason for that Mao and CCP leaders wanted a stable relationship with Soviets
was that they needed to recover from the end of the war. After the formal
meeting between Mao and Anastas Mikoyan, a Soviet politburo member, Zhou Enlai
met him separately.
“Zhou explained the
plans for the construction of China's political and diplomatic framework and
discussed such problems as the recovery of the transportation system and the
reconstruction of China's economy after the formation of the new China”[14].
Zhou
made it clear that the CCP wanted Soviet’s active participation in China's
post-revolution reconstruction. Although Mikoyan's trip did not produce a major
promise of Soviets to back up the RPC, the long term effect should not be ignored.
This was the first formal contact between the CCP leaders and the Soviet
Communist leaders in many years. Mikoyan's trip, actually, offered an
opportunity for both sides to become familiar with each other. It was also the
first step toward a new mutual understanding and cooperation between the RPC
and the Soviets, which would finally lead to the formation of the Sino-Soviet
alliance.[15]
Korean problem and China’s attitude before
the war
In the
meetings of Liu Shaoqi and Stalin after the CCP almost had the final victory in April
1949, Stalin claimed that China should take more responsibility in the revolution.
“Stalin
expressed the hope that the CCP would play a more important role in pushing
forward the rising tide of world revolution, especially in East Asia….. while the Soviet Union would focus on the West, China would take more responsibilities
in the East.”[16]
Less
than two months after Mao's "leaning-to-one-side" statement, Liu Shaoqi's
visit had brought in Soviet’s support. Mao and the CCP leadership understand Stalin's
attitude about the new China.
As the first
step that the RPC had at the international stage, the CCP Central Committee
decided that it was a good time for Mao to travel to Moscow and have a meeting
with Stalin. Mao hoped that this visit could bring a new alliance treaty with
the Soviet Union, which could replace the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty between the
GMD and the Russians.
As Mao
saw it later,
"(it) would
place the People's Republic in a favorable position by forcing those capitalist
countries to fit themselves to our principles; foreign countries would be
forced to recognize China unconditionally as well as to abolish those old
treaties and sign new treaties with us; and those capitalist countries would
dare not to take rash actions against us." [17]
A new
alliance with the Russians was Mao's first priority.
Although
the Soviets did not want to make a clear military commitment with China, they finally
concluded that it was good to their interests as they gain a lot but lose
little. In exchange for the Support from Soviets, Mao recognized the independence
of Outer Mongolia and allowed the Soviet Union to maintain their privileges in Manchuria,
including the control of Port Arthur for several more years. At the end, the
Sino-Soviet alliance came into being on 14 February 1950.
However,
as the topic of this paper, was the Korean problem discussed by Mao and Stalin during
Mao's visit to the Soviet Union? Sadly, Chen thinks that there has not enough
evidence to tell. What Chen emphasized is that Kim relied more on the Soviets
than on the Chinese in that period.[18]
“…the simple fact
that Kim informed Mao of his intention of attacking the South on his way back
from Moscow tells us that both the Soviet Union and China had at least some pre-knowledge
of North Korea's war preparations”[19]
There are
some reasons to improve that the CCP leaders might not participate reluctantly in
the Korean conflict. For example, in his first meeting with Stalin on December
16, 1949, Mao stressed the imperative of establishing international peace for
China's domestic economic recovery and reconstruction:
“The most important
question at the present time is the question of establishing peace. China needs
a period of three to five years of peace, which would be used to bring the
economy back to prewar levels and to stabilize the country in general.
Decisions on the most important questions in China hinge on the prospects for a
peaceful future. With this in mind the CC CCP [Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China] entrusted me to ascertain from you, Comrade Stalin,
in what way”[20]
Korea
was actually Mao's second-order priority so it was not deeply discussed in any
of the official Mao-Stalin summit talks in Moscow.[21]
However, at the end of the meeting, Beijing, in fact, got the promise of Soviet
to give military assistance in case of "aggression on the part of Japan or
any other state (United States) that may collaborate in any way with Japan in
acts of aggression." Stalin also agreed to provide a loan of $300 million
over five years for building fifty massive heavy industrial projects as well as
military aid in essential areas such as the construction of a PRC air force and
development of long-range artillery. But sadly, Beijing failed to get any aid
from Mongolia to "liberate" Taiwan, let alone a joint revolutionary
strategy for East Asia.[22]
The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the Korean War
A major
test for the Sino-Soviet alliance came only seven months after it had entered
into force in October 1950. Chinese leaders made an important decision to send
Chinese troops, in the name of “Chinese People’s Volunteers” (CPV), to enter
the Korean War.
From
Beijing's point of view, this test not only allowed Mao and his teams to test the
limitations of the alliance, but also provided a valuable opportunity to see
how the alliance could actually strengthen and consolidate the new socialist
bloc and unity in Asia[23].
China's experience to entry the Korean War would profoundly influence Mao's
strategic thinking about the future of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the future
of Sino-American relations.
When the
situation changed dramatically after U.S. troops landed at Inchon on September
15, Stalin's attitude regarding Soviet military assistance, especially Soviet
air support, changed. On October 1, the first day of the founding of the
People's Republic of China, Stalin pointed out that the situation in Korea was
grave and that without Chinese’s support the Korean Communist regime would
collapse. He then asked the Chinese to dispatch their troops to Korea but
without mentioning what kind of support the Soviet Union could offer to China, especially
on the question of Soviet air support.[24]
The
decision of sending the CPV to enter the Korean War was the most difficult one
that Mao and his fellow CCP leaders had to make in the first year of the PRC. Mao
told Stalin on October 2 that China would not send its troops to fight in Korea.
"…our entire
plan for peaceful reconstruction will be completely ruined, and many people in the
country will be dissatisfied."[25]
In fact,
Mao despised the United States as the greatest threat to the revolutionary
nationalism throughout East Asia even before the Korean War. According to Burton
Ira Kaufman,
“…he (Mao) was convinced that a war with the United States was
inevitable, and he was certain that he could defeat the United States in Korea….
he also viewed China’s participation in the war as a way of expanding Chinese
influence in East Asia, and eliminating counter revolutionary elements in
China.[26]
In some
way, Mao was right that the intervention of Chinese into the Korean War immediately
altered the balance of power on the Korean battlefield. Starting on November
25, Chinese troops began a vigorous counteroffensive to United State and United
Nation. Under the tremendous pressure, US/UN troops had to undertake what
Jonathan Pollack has called "the most infamous retreat in American military
history."[27] By
mid-December, the CPV and the Korean People’s Army (KPA) troops had regained the
control of nearly all the North Korean territory.[28]
After
thirty-seven months of fight, the U.S/U.N suffered 137,250 casualties[29]
and the South Koreans lost 400,000 troops, with a huge civilian loss as well.
For Chinese and North Korean, the casualties were close to two million. For
both sides, it was probably a huge and unexpected damage.
Roles in negotiation
Finally,
the Korean War was brought to an end (armistice) by signing armistice agreement
at Panmunjom on July 27, 1953. In reality, China wanted a negotiated settlement
as early as by late 1952 but it was disagreed by Stalin. From his perspective,
the protracted war and stalemate produced “multiple geostrategic” advantages
and benefits for the Soviet Union. The war between Chinese and U.S provided first-hand
intelligence about their military capabilities. It also drained American economic
and political resources, making Washington much less likely to launch a
full-scale war against the Soviet Union. The most favorable situation, according
to Shen, was in the war without expanding and contracting:
“….war without
expanding - in order to avoid the Soviet Union involved too much in the
conflict, and .war without contracting - to let United States stayed in the
Korean War."[30]
Above
all, Samuel S. Kim also concluded that the Korean War “deepened Beijing's
dependence on Soviet political, military and economic assistance, thus lessening
"the danger that Mao would follow the path of Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia,
an eventually that ranked among Stalin's greatest fears, second only, perhaps,
to a premature war with the US."[31]
During
the negotiation, from the perspective of some Western scholars, the Communists
always played some trick when doing preparation for the war:
“On 17
November the UN delegation proposed the current line of contact as the
demarcation line providing that all remaining agenda items were resolved within
thirty days. The communists accepted the proposal on 27 November debated the
remaining agenda items for thirty days, and then failed to reach agreement.
They used the thirty days to create a tactical defense so deeply dug in that
both sides had to accept a stalemate.[32]
But
everything change after Stalin died in 1953.
Turning point
On March
5 of 1953, Joseph Stalin died. Within few weeks, the Politburo of the Soviet
Communist Party voted that the war in Korea should be ended. On the other hand,
Mao Zedong received the news with dismay, but he knew that his army could not continue
the war without Soviet assistance. With a speed that amazed the negotiating
teams on both sides, the Chinese accepted the voluntary repatriation.
The
agreement provided for[33]:
1) A suspension of
open hostilities;
2) A fixed
demarcation line with a four kilometre (2.4 mile) buffer zone - the so-called
demilitarization zone;
3) A mechanism for
the transfer of prisoners of war.
Both
sides pledged not to "execute any hostile act within, from, or against the
demilitarized zone", or enter areas under control of the other. The war
finally ended on 27 July 1953 when the armistice was signed.
The meaning of negotiation for China
“…negotiations would be managed by the
Chinese, an unparalleled chance to appear an equal of the United States in Asia
and a slap at the hated Japanese. The Koreans were not a factor for either
side.”[34]
For
China, although its troops suffered huge casualties, Beijing succeeded in
forcing the strongest superpower on earth to compromise in Korea. United State
also accepted China’s representatives equally at the bargaining table. It had a
great meaning for China. Indeed, the Korean War confirmed the role of “significant
others” that China would like to play in the international stage.
By
successfully forcing the strongest nation on earth to compromise in Korea and
to accept China’s representatives equally at the bargaining table, Samuel S.
Kim concluded that
“Beijing had successfully overcome the hundred
years of national humiliation (from the 1840s to 1940s) and its appropriated
national identity as the “Sick Man of Asia.”[35]
But China
did pay a huge cost to win the name. More than 740,000 casualties including
Mao’s eldest son, China missed the opportunity to “liberate” Taiwan. At the
same time, China was excluded from the United Nations for more than two
decades, and lost twenty years in its modernization drive. Also, the Korean War
affected the Sino-Soviet relationship. The Sino-Soviet alliance was greatly
strengthened in the short run, especially before when that they still shared
values and shared fears, but weakened in the long run.
Conclusion
“Ideology, image,
and a desire to swing the global balance of power in the Communists’ favor
prompted the three states to take a calculated risk in Korea. Without the
approval and assistance of the two giant Communist powers, Kim Il Sung could
not have determined to reunify the divided country by force. Moscow and Beijing
were also responsible for a prolonged war that lasted more than three years,
including two years after the armistice talks started.”[36]
I
believed that the Soviet Union, the PRC, and North Korea did calculate very carefully
the military balance between North and South Korea and seriously evaluated the
possibility of U.S. army’s intervention to the war before Stalin allowed North
Korea to attack South Korea. Also, Moscow and Beijing coordinated their roles
in the event of U.S.’s intervention and they did have their own interest to
getting involved in the war. Stalin might have viewed U.S. intervention as the opportunity
to stand on a more invincible position which would achieve a speedy victory if
the U.S. did not intervene, or lead the U.S. and China into military conflict if
the U.S. did enter the war.
Basically,
Pyongyang cooperated with Moscow to make the plan to create the war. Stalin also
helped North Korean army to reform for a better preparation. At the same time,
Moscow played a very important role leading Kim to coordinate with Mao on the
tactics of the campaigns.
During
the war, the CPV commanded the North Korean army and launched several major campaigns
in the conflict with South Korean army and United States. To end the war, Chinese
negotiators played a significant role in leading the armistice talks. Mao even
persuaded Stalin to set the 38th parallel as the demarcation line
and not to withdrawal of foreign troops on the agenda[37].
To summarize generally, cooperation among the Communist bloc was under solidified
leadership of Mao Zedong and Stalin. The three Communist states could work together
successfully in conducting and ending the war, arguably in favor of them.
[3] Soo Sung
Cho, Korea in
World Politics, 1940-1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility(University of California Press
(1967)), pp.54-56
[5] Fan Zhang, The Role of Ideology and Interest in Stalin’s Engagement
with China, e-Internationals
relations
[6] Shen Zhihua, Mao,
Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s (Milton
Park, Abingdon ; New York: Routledge, Cold War History Series, 2012)
[7] Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War
and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (Oxford University Press, USA (October 8,
1998)), pp.12
[9] Byong Moo Hwang, The Role and Responsibilities of
China and the Former Soviet Union in the Korean War, International Journal
of Korean Studies · Fall 2010, pp.104
[11] The standard work on the Korean War remained for many years, David
Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: Hamish Hamilton, 1964).
[12] Mao Zedong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," 30
June 1949, Mao Zedong xuanji, Beijing: The People's Press, 1965.
[13] CHEN
JIAN, THE SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE AND CHINA’S ENTRY INTO THE KOREAN WAR, Cold
War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars Washington D.C, 1992
[17] Mao Zedong to the CCP Central Committee, 3 January 1950, Mao Zedong
wengao, I, 213;
Han et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao,
pp. 24-25.
[18] Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, in "China's Decision to Enter the
Korean War: History Revisited," in The China Quarterly, 121 (March 1990),
100
[19] CHEN JIAN, THE SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE AND CHINA’S ENTRY INTO THE
KOREAN WAR, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars Washington D.C, 1992
[20] Odd A. Westad, “Record of Conversation, Stalin and Mao Zedong,
December 16, 1949,," in Westad, ed. Brothers in Arms, p. 314.
[22] Samuel S. Kim, Reactions of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to the
U.S.-ROK Alliance, International Journal of Korean Studies ·
Vol. XV, No. 1, Columbia University 2011, P.6
[25] Westad "Introduction," pp. 1-2; Rosemary Foot, The
Practice of Power: US
Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press), p. 13.
[26] Burton Ira Kaufman, The Korean War: challenges in crisis,
credibility, and command, McGraw, 1996. PP.37-44
[27] Jonathan D. Pollack, "The Korean War and Sino-American
Relations," in Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955: A Joint Assessment of a Critical
Decade, Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds. (Wilmington, Del.: SR Books,
1989), p.224.
[29] Ministry of National Defense, ROK-US Alliance and USFK, rev. ed.
(Seoul: Ministry of National Defense 2008), p. 8.
[30] Shen Zhihua, Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist
Relations in the 1950s (Milton Park, Abingdon ; New York: Routledge, Cold War
History Series, 2012)
[31] Weathersby, "Stalin, Mao, and the End of the Korean War,"
in Westad. ed., Brothers in Arms, pp. 109-110.
[32] John Whiteclay Chambers, The Oxford Companion to American Military
History, Oxford
University Press, USA, 2000
[34] William L. Hosch , The Korean War and the Vietnam War: People,
Politics, and Power (America at War), Rosen Education Service; 1 edition (December 20, 2009), P.P.38
[35] Samuel S. Kim, Reactions of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to the U.S.-ROK
Alliance, International Journal of Korean Studies • Vol. XV, No. 1, Columbia
University 2011, P.27
[36] Ibid. P.34
[37] Byong Moo Hwang, The Role and Responsibilities of China and the
Former Soviet Union in the Korean War, International Journal of Korean Studies
• Fall 2010, pp.119
